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Abstract— Software components for on-board architectures in 
the space domain are increasingly reliant on Commercial Off-
The-Shelf (COTS), Open Source (OSS) or other third party 
software products. However, these software components often 
have not been built with mission critical requirements in mind. 
Development project teams incorporating these products have 
limited knowledge of or control over the processes applied during 
the design, implementation, testing and maintenance of selected 
COTS/OSS software products. These constraints generate 
uncertainty of potential software induced failures. Moreover, the 
lack of information regarding security vulnerabilities increases 
the risks of their usage, since their exploitation might lead to 
undesired behaviour of the software and therefore to a system 
failure. The purpose of this paper is to present a combined 
approach that takes into account reliability and security 
enhancements for third party software, based on Time-Space 
Partitioning and Multiple Levels of Security. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Space systems have been increasingly relying on software 
components for all kind of tasks: commanding, telemetry 
collection, attitude and orbit control, payload management, 
thermal control, etc. A complex spacecraft such as the 
Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) consists of up to one 
million lines of code, the flight application software contains 
450 Kloc [1]. Because of the large size of software systems, it 
is not uncommon that they include not only reused components 
of previous missions, but third party components developed 
outside supervision of the project team, for example, 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) or even Open Source 
Software (OSS). One of the main challenges of the 
development of space systems with third party software 
products is to provide confidence that those software 
components perform as specified in their requirements within 
the target operational environment [2]. Considering the 
uncertainty caused by the lack of development visibility of 
these software components and the potential for failure, this 
essentially implies meeting Dependability requirements. For 
this purpose, there exists a variety of methods for fault 
prevention, tolerance, removal and forecasting. However, 
software Security is concerned with integrity, confidentiality 
and availability requirements. Due to the inability to assure the 
compliance of externally developed software components with 
these requirements, an additional set of Security methods, such 
as partitioning, ciphering and vulnerability prevention, could be 
included in the system design. 
The important aspect to take into account is that both 
Security and Dependability are strongly interdependent, 
generating opportunities of complementarity and potential 
trade-offs. There are approaches that can be used during the 
development of the software in order to assure required levels 
of Security and Dependability when third party software is 
present. In this paper we will discuss containers, safety/security 
boxes, inhibitors, monitors and how they can be combined. 
II. A COMBINED APPROACH FOR SECURITY AND 
DEPENDABILITY: THE SEPARATION KERNEL 
A previous study about Software Failure Propagation 
Prevention [3] analysed methods to prevent failure propagation 
between on board software components and to other parts of 
the system. It concluded that the most appropriate technology 
to address failure propagation, namely due to resource hogging 
and resource violation failures, is the use of a separation kernel. 
Separation kernels provide Time and Space Partitioning (TSP) 
[4][5] of applications into their own partitions which prevents 
failure propagation via the unplanned use of shared resources 
of CPU and memory [6]. They also implement the concept of 
Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) that was 
developed to simplify monolithic security kernels enforcing 
security policies [7], allow controlled communications between 
non-kernel partitions, and enable the applications to enforce 
their own security policies. 
Separation kernels provide a safety/security box for third 
party software products. All the software in the partition 
containing the third party software is designated as having the 
lowest Dependability and Security assurance level. As all the 
software in a partition shares the same resources, any failures 
can be propagated between software components in that 
specific partition but not to other partitions containing higher 
criticality software functions. Therefore, the separation kernel 
provides the core component of the trusted computing base 
which enforces the Dependability and Security properties of 
the system. 
In the context of the presence of third party (COTS/OSS) 
software, the separation kernel needs to be configured taking 
into account these specific requirements: 
· Memory of the other partitions must not be visible or 
writable by the COTS/OSS software partition. There 
must not be any shared memory resources between 
partitions. 
· Information flow from one partition to another must be 
from an authenticated source to authenticated recipients; 
the source of information is authenticated to the 
recipient, and information goes only where intended. 
· It must be ensured that the microprocessor and any 
networking equipment cannot be used as a covert 
channel to leak information. 
· Damage is limited by preventing a failure in one 
partition from cascading to any other partition. Failures 
are detected, contained, and recovered locally. 
In addition to the separation kernel the design must include 
a number of elements to support the requirements: A 
Communication Controller, Confidentiality and Dependability 
guards and Monitors. 
The Communication Controller manages the routing of the 
communication between the COTS/OSS partition and other on 
board applications or externally. It is functionally similar to a 
router for inter-partition communication within a Time and 
Space Partitioned system. It protects against unauthorized 
transmission of data between applications of different levels of 
confidentiality. However, it also must allow reconfiguration of 
information flows by modifying the data tables in one partition. 
Guards prevent confidential information, unreliable 
information or empty information being passed to another 
application. 
Monitors observe independently the operation of the 
COTS/OSS in its partition. They are either active, where they 
cyclically check the operation of the OSS, or passive, where 
they respond to a failure event in the COTS/OSS partition. 
When a failure is detected they start appropriate recovery 
actions. 
The Communication Controller, the Monitors and the 
Guards must be independent, so they must not be located in the 
COTS/OSS partition, but in the so called System partition.  
III. CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of combined dependability and security 
techniques based on a separation kernel have been 
demonstrated considering third party software products [8].  
It should be noted that there was no need to perform a 
trade-off between Security and Dependability requirements 
except when defining the reliability and confidentiality guards. 
Some checks, such as data structure and consistency, might 
depend on application knowledge. If they were placed in the 
application that produced the data itself then they would be 
performed after the data is passed through the Communication 
Controller and confidentiality guards. As this could potentially 
cause a conflict with the confidentiality guards, it is 
recommended that the reliability and availability checks are 
performed by the application that receives the data.  
The components of the System Partition, in particular the 
confidentiality and dependability Guards, are of static nature, 
depending on the applications run in the different partitions, 
therefore if the different applications are uploaded, they should 
be modified (via patching of the System Partition itself). 
A demonstration for on-board image processing using a 
COTS library was developed in order to prove the concept. 
This demonstration identified a number of performance effects. 
First, due to the use of Inter-Partition Communication, copying 
extra data is required (10.5 % CPU time measured in the 
demonstrator), and there is additional idle time between 
partition activations. Moreover the execution of  a central 
Communication Controller implies that further Inter-Partition 
Communication is needed (4.2 % CPU time).  In the case of 
software maintenance, third party elements need to be 
uploaded in full, this requires a significantly longer time to 
restart a partition than a usual maintenance operation, where 
partial patching can be performed. Finally, there is additional 
memory required for the separation kernel and the guest 
operating systems needed to run the different third party 
applications. 
The decision whether to use any third party software 
component or develop it completely new should also be guided 
by the impact in the complexity of the overall design. Although 
not part of the objectives of the current research, it seems 
reasonable that COTS/OSS products with limited assurance 
knowledge might be most suitable for providing on board 
processing to supply higher order data products that are not 
critical to the spacecraft’s operation.  
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